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While many read Lacan as a structuralist who sought to over-
throw the authority of first-person conscious experience, his 
work also has resonances and affinities with a broadly phenom-
enological approach to psychoanalysis. This connection comes 
into focus when we bring Lacan’s concept of the imaginary 
stage into dialogue with Freud’s early work on hysteria. Lacan 
implied that the imaginary stage, while necessary for human 
development, nevertheless frustrates a significant dimension of 
being human, viz. the human being’s internally conflictual and 
contradictory experience that calls into question the very idea of 
a unified self or subject. When we read the early Freud’s work, 
we find that he is attempting to liberate the hysteric’s self-expe-
rience from just this kind of imaginary illusion of unified selfhood 
that would restrict and even denies the vicissitudes of subjective 
thinking, feeling, and desiring.
48
he Mirror Stage as Formative 
of the I Function as Revealed 
in Psychoanalytic Experience” 
might be the most famous 
paper Jacques Lacan ever wrote.1 My paper 
explores one—but only one—way of taking up 
the insights of this rich text in order in order 
to show an interesting convergence of theme 
with Freud’s early case study on the hysteria 
of Elisabeth von R. The convergence concerns, 
in particular, the question of self-experience, 
indeed the experience of being a self at all.
In his famous and brief paper Lacan 
(1949/2006) speaks of “the I function in the 
experience psychoanalysis provides us of it” 
(p. 75, original emphasis). Psychoanalysis is 
an experience that gives a new experience of 
selfhood. That said, what does psychoanalytic 
experience reveal about the first-person self? 
It reveals that the I is an “identification” with 
an image of oneself first attained during the 
mirror stage, but continuing throughout life 
(p. 76). For Lacan, this identification happens 
early. The infant’s self-experience, if we can 
even speak of it, begins in a maelstrom of 
chaos, multiplicity, and discontinuity of his 
or her embodied and rudimentary thoughts, 
feelings, and wishes. In the midst of this storm 
of felt experience, the infant discovers, in theo-
ry by seeing his or her image in a mirror, that 
he is one kind of entity—and not many. He or 
she “assumes an image” (p. 76) of a unified self 
that the mirror reflects to him or her.
Yet, just because original spontaneous 
experience is multiple and discontinuous, this 
mirror-image of the self that purports to say 
that the self is one, “situates the agency known 
as the ego, prior to its social determination, 
in a fictional direction” (p. 76). The fictional 
character of the ego, of the personal conscious 
sense of being one unified agent of thought, 
feeling, desire, and action, of one’s very self 
as a seamless I, will always be in “discordance 
with [the person’s] own reality” (p. 76) in its 
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multiple, chaotic, discontinuous experience 
—a grammar of experience that is present 
not only in human infancy. Thus, the image 
creates in the beginning, and goes on creating 
throughout life, what Lacan calls an “alien-
ating destination” (p. 76) for the subject. This 
image of oneself as a seamless I or self seduces 
the subject into positing the “organic inad-
equacy of his natural reality” (p. 77) and then 
fleeing it. This inadequate organic reality just 
is the experience of the “fragmented body” 
(p. 78) that the ego denies and represses when 
it creates the I and the self-image or self-con-
cept we have of ourselves as an I, as one kind 
of entity. Hence, again, we have what Lacan 
calls “the alienating I function” (p. 79). He 
thus unmasks “the function of misrecognition 
that characterizes the ego”—a misrecognition 
that enforces “imaginary servitude” (p. 80), 
i.e. servitude to the imaginary, domination by 
and subordination of the discontinuous and 
multiple and chaotic moments of sponta-
neous thinking, feeling, and desiring, to the 
imagined unity and character of the self.
Lacan’s understanding of the imaginary, 
then, has to do with the issue of human 
self-image, self-understanding, in particular 
when that image or understanding posits 
the self as a unified, seamless, internally 
cohering entity. This concern with self-image  
or self-understanding converges interestingly 
with work by the early Freud, the Freud 
whose work Lacan so appreciated. Lacan’s 
notion of the imaginary, in this case, is a 
convergence with Freud, and Lacan is, here,  
a kind of Freudian. What do I mean?
In the case studies on hysteria, Freud 
(1895/2000) is significantly concerned with 
conscious experience. Indeed his work has  
a phenomenological dimension: he clarifies  
certain essences of psychological experience 
for his patients, i.e. how they qualitatively 
think, desire, and feel in their own first-per-
son subjectivity. Nevertheless, Freud is not 
merely a phenomenologist: he goes further 
than just reflection. For he believes that 
patients come to experience painful neurotic 
symptoms because they refuse certain of 
the moments of concrete, direct, immediate 
experiences he has phenomenologically noted. 
Neurotics resist and repress these moments of 
experience that prove too dangerous to their 
self-image and self-understanding—they 
are too sexual, too aggressive, too novel, too 
disruptive, too self-questioning. The paradox 
Freud points out, however, is that neurotic 
symptoms find a cure only if we acknowledge 
and embrace just these kinds of dangerous 
subjective experiences. Moreover, doing 
so means that we must embrace a kind of 
selfhood, or self-experience, that goes beyond 
any kind of unified self-image.
Freud’s diagnosis is that the pathogenesis 
of Elisabeth von R.’s symptom was her refusal 
of an immediate and spontaneous desire. 
She experienced an untoward desire that she 
then, in turn, almost immediately refused to 
allow to remain in her conscious experience: 
a sexual desire for her brother-in-law and 
an attendant gladness that her sister is dead 
so that her brother-in-law is available as an 
object of romantic attention. However, as his 
experience with neurotics was teaching him, 
Freud had begun to learn that we humans 
cannot unwish a wish, or unfeel a feeling, or 
unthink a thought—try as we might! When 
a conscious thought, feeling, or desire is so 
repugnant to us that we cannot allow ourselves 
to retain it in consciousness, our only option 
is to repress it. But we humans are also bad at 
repression—indeed we find it impossible—
and so there is a return of the repressed in the 
form of an initially unintelligible symptom, 
one usually psychosomatic in the case of a 
hysteric neurotic like those Freud was treating 
in his Vienna.
But why is there in Elisabeth, as in all  
of us, the desire, the impulse, to repress a con-
scious moment of experience in the first place? 
We repress moments of thinking, feeling, and 
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wishing that are intolerable to self-image,  
to self-understanding. She and we fold the  
current of conscious experience violently 
against itself and repress it into the uncon-
scious, from whence it returns painfully as 
a mysterious, physiologically inexplicable 
symptom. 
Let me try to parse the situation out by 
engaging Freud’s own words. He tells us that 
Elisabeth is a young woman with feelings, 
desires, and thoughts of love: “Here, then, was 
the unhappy story of this proud girl with her 
longing for love” (Freud, 1895/2000p. 143).  
Yet there is also jealousy and envy, for Elisabeth 
feels “the contrast between her own loneli-
ness and her sick sister’s married happiness,”  
a contrast that was “painful to her” and that 
gave her “a burning wish that she might be as 
happy as her sister” (p. 151). When her sister 
dies, though, Elisabeth immediately suffers 
from excruciating leg pains that prevent her 
from moving. She is not forthcoming about 
why she cannot walk. Indeed she is herself, 
initially, truly unaware of the cause. Hence 
the mystery: a young woman who wants to 
love sees her sister dead, a sister whom she 
envied for her enjoyment of the kind of love 
Elisabeth wanted, and now Elisabeth cannot 
walk. Elisabeth herself, we might say, has 
died to some degree too through becoming 
immobile and corpse-like.
Freud wants to solve the mystery. To do 
so, he enforces the rule of free association on 
Elisabeth, a rule according to which “she was 
under an obligation to remain completely 
objective and say what had come into her head, 
whether it was appropriate or not. Finally, I 
declared that I knew very well that something 
had occurred to her and that she was conceal-
ing it from me; but she would never be free of 
her pains so long as she concealed anything”  
(p. 154). Freud speculates that she had experi-
enced some wish, feeling, or idea that she had 
then repressed and somaticized in the form  
of leg pains. In our terms, she had suffered—
in the sense of undergone and undergone 
painfully—an experience that she did not 
want to experience. She had an experience 
that she tried to refuse. This experience was so 
intolerable that she arrested her experiential 
current to eject the proleptic experience out 
into the unconscious, from whence it returned 
as the psychosomatic symptom. But what was 
the experience exactly?
The upfront experience was her wish to 
possess erotically and romantically her broth-
er-in-law, who was free now that Elisabeth’s 
sister was dead. This theory is not only Freud’s 
speculation: through free-associative remem-
bering, Elisabeth finally admits it, although 
not comfortably or willingly. She remembers 
more or less consciously that she once took a 
walk with her brother-in-law, in which “She 
found herself in complete agreement with 
everything he said, and a desire to have a 
husband like him became very strong in her” 
(p. 155). But the traumatic experience comes 
later as she sees her sister’s dead body. When 
she comes into the bedroom where her sister’s 
body was laid out, she “stood before the bed 
and looked at her sister as she lay there dead. 
At that very moment of dreadful certainty 
that her beloved sister was dead . . . at that 
very moment another thought had shot 
through Elisabeth’s mind, and now forced 
itself irresistibly upon her once more, like a 
flash of lightning in the dark: ‘Now he is free 
again and I can be his wife’” (p. 156). She has 
an ever so brief moment of wishing—lust and 
love—toward her brother-in-law, which is so 
horrible to her that she immediately rejects it 
and ejects it—so she thinks—from the stream 
of her experienced consciousness. Therefore, 
there is an experience, an erotic wish, which 
Elisabeth seems unable to directly experience 
because it conflicts with her image of herself 
and her understanding about what kind of 
person she is and should be. 
But what if, just here, it is not this wish 
that is what is most pathogenic for Elisabeth? 
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What if it is her self-image, her seld-under-
standing, the sense of herself that is dear to her 
that is really the problem? We might think that 
Elisabeth’s strong stake in sustaining her image 
of herself is the problem, because without this 
self-image her desire for her brother-in-law 
might have been tolerable to her. Elisabeth 
sees herself as a moral person, as someone who 
would never think of becoming romantically 
involved with her just dead sister’s husband. 
As Freud writes, “The girl felt towards her 
brother-in-law a tenderness whose acceptance 
into consciousness was resisted by her whole 
moral being. She succeeded in sparing herself 
the painful conviction that she loved her sister’s 
husband by inducing physical pains in herself 
instead . . . her pains had come on, thanks to 
successful conversion” (p. 157). In order to 
retain her moral—or moralistic—self-image 
she has to eliminate from consciousness her 
libidinal desire to possess her sister’s widower 
when her sister’s body is not even cold. In 
psychodynamic terms, two forces are motivat-
ing her—the wish for her brother-in-law and 
the wish to be the kind of person who would 
never wish for her brother-in-law—and she is 
caught in the middle with only a symptomatic 
road to go down to solve the conflict.
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning here 
that the wish itself is not the primary threat; 
nor, perhaps, is the danger to her self-image. 
The most profound threat Elisabeth fears 
may be her own multiplicity and discontin- 
nuity of experience. She cannot tolerate  
her untoward desire(s) because to tolerate 
them would mean that she is ‘the kind of 
person’ who has such desires. Moreover, if 
she is that kind of person, then she is only 
that kind of person. That is, if she is one  
and only one person with one and only one 
trajectory of wishing, feeling, and thinking 
that has to operate in a coherent, continuous 
way, then she is, in fantasy at least, a horrible 
person, so horrible that she cannot admit it 
to herself.
At this point a full discussion of symp-
tom-formation would need to happen, and a 
detailed investigation of the process of therapy. 
But I want to focus on a particular dimension 
of the cure. For Elisabeth is, at one level, 
making what we might call an ethical choice,  
a choice to refuse to experience her experience.
For, eventually, a breakthrough or healing 
came: “the girl’s wish, of which she was now 
conscious” (p. 159). Her wish, once conscious, 
then repressed and unconscious, is now felt as 
a wish among wishes, an experience among 
experiences, along and within the fullness of 
her flow of consciousness, where experiences 
can come and go, rise and fall away, as they 
will when left unhindered in their vicissitudes. 
The cure happens through a paradox: while 
“we are not responsible for our feelings,” 
(p. 157) we are responsible for feeling our 
feelings, wishing our wishes, experiencing 
our experiences, however unpalatable to the 
self-images we cherish.
Here is Freud’s ethics of life, his ethics 
of experience: we often need to experience 
our experience even when it seems safer not 
to do so. Yet the ethics of directly experiencing 
experience is profoundly difficult. We can 
listen to Freud as he describes the process of 
Elisabeth von R.’s coming home to her desire: 
“the recovery of this repressed idea had a 
shattering effect on the poor girl. She cried 
aloud when I put the situation drily before 
her with the words: ‘So for a long time you 
had been in love with your brother-in-law’. 
She complained at this moment of the most 
frightful pains, and made one last desperate 
effort to reject the explanation: it was not true, 
I had talked her into it, it could not be true, she 
was incapable of such wickedness, she could 
never forgive herself for it” (p. 157). While the 
pains did seem to dissolve, a different pain 
would never dissolve: the pain of coming to 
know oneself as a person who has untoward 
(but still very human) desires alongside so-
called moral desires. Here is where the pain 
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of the symptomatic leg ache has to be trans-
formed into the more direct pain of what 
we might call being human. This process is 
necessary if we are to attain Freud’s idea of 
psychic health—experiencing the full texture 
of our experience—but it can be hellish 
because one’s—often moral—self-image is 
called into question. Elisabeth had to accept 
that she was the ‘kind of person’ who desired 
erotically and romantically her brother-in-
law when her sister had just died.
As a human being, she had to recognize 
that her phenomenological stream involved 
profound sexuality and aggression. While 
Freud would focus on aggression later in his 
work, it is not too much to say that we see here 
a sexual and aggressive victory on Elisabeth’s 
part. Her sister is gone, and Elisabeth is glad, 
for now her brother-in-law can become her 
husband. For a proper, moral, even moralistic 
person like Elisabeth, coming to terms with 
accepting this phenomenology of her experi-
ence means coming to terms with phenome-
nological essences, such as sex and aggression, 
which may not be pretty. Few people want to 
think of themselves as feeling jealousy, envy, 
or death wishes, especially toward those they 
love. Nevertheless, Freud says that these are 
precisely the wishes and feelings we feel and 
repress into the unconscious. Moreover, he 
insists, we have to feel them directly and fully 
if we are to keep up our psychical health. The 
first dimension of sustaining our psychic health 
is continuing our participation in the immedi-
acy and continuity of our spontaneous stream 
of experience, and we can only do so if we are 
willing to embrace the concrete content of that 
stream of experience directly.
Furthermore, beyond coming to terms 
with the facts of what she thinks shameful, 
sexuality and aggression, she has to come to 
terms with another fact. For she has been 
making an even more pathogenic choice to 
be one and only one ‘kind of person’. For 
Elisabeth von R., her self-image, her self- 
understanding, as a particular kind of unified 
person is itself the problem. Neurotics need, in 
certain ways at least, to become less in touch 
with the imaginary illusion of their self-unity. 
Thus Elisabeth’s desire for her brother-in-law 
is not her only fantasy. Her self-image as 
unified and coherent, as one and only one kind 
of person, is also a fantasy. It is this fantasy 
that fundamentally and primarily punishes 
her, that is the engine of her resistance to her 
sexual and aggressive experience, and that is 
the cause of her symptomatic pain.
Thus while Freud emphasizes difficult, 
dangerous dimensions of the human being’s 
lived experience of consciousness’s vicissitudes, 
such as aggression and sex, the most dangerous 
essence of experience may be the conflictual, 
fragmentary totality of the experiential flow 
itself—or, perhaps better put, flows themselves. 
Freud’s aim, that is, was not only to lead us to 
experience or embrace our sexual or aggressive 
feelings, as if that was the end of it. His broad-
er mission was to restore us humans to an 
existence in which we could more capaciously 
embrace and sustain the whole gamut of our 
experience—to feel all our many feelings, 
to wish all our many wishes, to think all our 
many thoughts, good, bad, and neutral simply 
because they happen and are ours. That is, 
Freud invited Elisabeth to return to the always 
already present, but often resisted, stream of 
her multiple, chaotic, self-contradictory, and 
discontinuous experience that defines human 
life. This picture of human being stands in 
contrast to any sense—in Lacan’s terms any 
fiction—she has had of herself as one unified, 
coherent, seamless kind of person.
Freud’s treatment of Elizabeth was an  
attempt to liberate her from imaginary illusions 
of unified selfhood that constrict the often 
anarchic vicissitudes of her real concrete flows 
of experience. Freud tries to liberate her from 
a problematic, pathogenic imaginary ‘capture’ 
that traps her so she can acknowledge and 
embrace, in some sense, all her experiences— 
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all of her thoughts, feelings, and wishes— 
for the first time. She has always experienced 
multiply and chaotically and discontinuously, 
but only indirectly. The cure for Elizabeth is  
to learn to live beyond a unified but false self- 
image that has forced to deny and frustrate 
her multifarious, differentiated, disconnected 
feelings and desires so that she can live out 
her conscious experience directly for the first 
time instead of repressing dimensions of it 
into the unconscious. She embraces experi-
ence’s fundamental logic(s) at an epistemic 
and existential level. Conscious experience is 
discontinuous, incoherent (it does not cohere), 
and conflictual. Freud brings Elizabeth to a 
place where her subjective experience (beyond 
an imaginary self, so to speak) is consciously 
conflictual and differentiated in its many 
flows, all of which are irreconcilable into only 
one self-image of ‘the kind of person’ she is. 
For she is many and different.
Returning to Lacan, I hope the reader 
has sensed the convergence between Lacan 
and Freud this paper has tried to make 
visible. Lacan shows how a baby must pass 
from an original, fragmentary real into the 
imaginary in order to begin to be a subject 
at all, but he also hints that this imaginary 
stage alienates us from dimensions of being 
human that fundamentally define our original 
and ongoing body-experience. For Lacan, 
we have to learn to live within and after the 
mirror-stage, to be sure. However, his work 
also raises the question whether the imaginary 
and so-called unified self— which would be 
a self without experiential conflict, difference, 
contradiction, and discontinuity of thoughts, 
feelings, and wishes—that is dependent upon 
the mirror-stage or mirror-phase in turn 
presents its own problems to human thriving.  
Does imaginary capture, because it is fictional 
and alienating to embodied experience, also 
diminish us psychically?
In a way resonant with Lacan, Freud 
shows how Elisabeth von R. has to learn to  
live a life beyond the imaginary, beyond the 
unified image of herself as one kind of person 
that she has assumed. For such an image is 
fictional, self-alienating, neurosis-generating. 
Paradoxically, one gets to know oneself, who 
one is, when one lets go of the notion that one 
is one, that there is one self to be experienced, 
acknowledged, and known, and lived. 
In conclusion, I do not mean to claim 
that Freud’s and Lacan’s work are identical,  
or that they make the same points in the same 
way. Nevertheless, while both seem to imply 
that we need a unified self-image in at least 
some sense, both also seem to diagnose the 
pathogenic character of such a unified self- 
image. Their work invites us to think about 
ways that we can resist being completely 
dominated by myths of self-unity. In doing 
so, Freud and Lacan offer us the possibility to 
tarry a little more loosely in the realm of the 
imaginary, in the images that we inevitably 
hold of our selfhood—and perhaps that of 
others as well. Such tarrying would entail a 
more difficult existence without the securities 
of knowing who we are. Even so, such tarrying 
might also entail a more generous, forgiving, 
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